Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22960 
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dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:24Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:24Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22960-
dc.description.abstractAccording to New Institutional Economics, two or more individuals will found an organization, if it leads to a benefit compared to market allocation. A natural consequence will then be internal rent seeking. We discuss the interrelation between profits, rent seeking and the foundation of organizations. Typically, we expect that highly profitable firms are always founded but it is not clear whether the same is true for firms with less optimistic prospects. We will show that internal rent seeking may lead to a completely reversed result. The impact of internal rent seeking on overall investment and the implications of firm size and competition on the foundation of organizations are also addressed.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x15/2006en
dc.subject.jelM2en
dc.subject.jelL2en
dc.subject.jelD2en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcontestsen
dc.subject.keywordfoundation of organizationsen
dc.subject.keywordinternal rent seekingen
dc.titleOn the "Adverse Selection" of Organizations-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn519436237en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:152006-

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