Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22868 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 19/2003
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we consider the problem of regulating an open access essential facility. A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market under the roof of a regulatory mechanism. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both competitors use the same essential input to provide the final services to the consumers. The regulator designs a mechanism that guarantees financing of the essential input and adequate competition in the downstream market. We consider a regulatory mechanism that grants non-discriminatory access of the essential facility to a competitor. We show that this mechanism is welfare improving but it generates inefficient entry. That is a more efficient competitor may stay out of the market or a less efficient competitor may enter the market.
Schlagwörter: 
Regulation
Railways
Network
Entry
Competition
Access charge
Asymmetric Information
JEL: 
L51
H54
D82
L11
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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