Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/226302 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8600
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We experimentally study the impact of framing effects in a repeated sequential social dilemma game. Our between-subjects design consists of two group level ("Wall Street" vs. "Community") and two individual level ("First (Second) Movers" vs. "Leaders (Followers)") frames. We find that average contributions are significantly higher when the game is called the Wall Street game than when it is called the Community game. However, the social framing effect disappears when we control for players' first-order and second-order beliefs. Overall, our evidence indicates that social frames enter people's beliefs rather than their preferences.
Subjects: 
framing
public good
experiment
beliefs
JEL: 
H41
C72
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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