Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/225341 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SAFE Working Paper No. 234
Versionsangabe: 
This version: June 2020
Verlag: 
Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
By employing a dynamic model with two limit order books, we show that fragmentation is associated with reduced competition among liquidity suppliers and lower picking-off risk of limit orders. Due to these countervailing channels, the impact of fragmentation on liquidity and welfare differs with asset volatility: when volatility is high (low), liquidity and aggregate welfare in a fragmented market are higher (lower) than in a single market. However, fragmentation always shifts welfare away from agents with exogenous trading motives and towards intermediaries. We empirically corroborate our model’s predictions about liquidity. Our model reconciles the mixed results in the empirical literature.
Schlagwörter: 
Fragmentation
Competition
Liquidity
Price Efficiency
JEL: 
G10
G12
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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