Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/224821 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series No. 19-195
Publisher: 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Department of International Development, London
Abstract: 
We examine the relationship between road quality and regional favouritism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Roads are an important public good in Africa, not only because of their positive impact on economic development but also because they are a major focus of central government spending. Using data from up to twelve countries from rounds 3 through 6 of the Afrobarometer on the existence of paved roads and regional, round, and country/round fixed effects, we find a negative effect of having a co-regional president, such that co-regional presidents provide poorer quality roads to their home areas than to other parts of the country. This result exists at both the highest (provincial) and second-highest (district) level of local government, and is robust to a variety of controls and sub-samples. We examine qualitative evidence from three countries which suggests that Presidents channel regional favouritism towards their co-ethnic/co-regional elite at the expense of the non-elite.
Subjects: 
roads
infrastructure
Africa
regional favouritism
Afrobarometer
regime transitions
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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