Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/223429 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8357
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
How do parties motivate candidates to exert effort in closed-list elections? If each candidate’s primary goal is winning a seat, then those in safe and hopeless list positions have weak incentives to campaign. We present a model in which (i) candidates care about both legislative seats and the higher offices available when their party enters government; and (ii) parties commit to allocating higher offices monotonically with list rank. This model predicts that the volume and geo-diversity of candidates’ campaign efforts will increase as their list rank improves. Using new data cover-ing Norwegian parliamentary candidates’ use of mass and social media during the 2017 election, we find clear support for this prediction. As their list rank increases, candidates shift from intra-district to extra-district media exposure—which cannot help them win their own seats; but can improve their party’s chance of entering government, and thus their own potential share of the spoils.
Subjects: 
party lists
cabinet promotion
Gamson’s law
proportional representation
voter mobilization
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.