Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/222061 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2019/14
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
We study linearly weighted versions of the least core and the (pre)nucleolus and investigatethe reduction possibilities in their computation. We slightly extend some well-known related results and establish their counterparts by using the dual game. Our main results imply, for example, that if the core of the game is not empty, all dually inessential coalitions (which can be weakly minorized by a partition in the dual game) can be ignored when we compute the per-capita least core and the per-capita (pre)nucleolus from the dual game. This could lead to the design of polynomial time algorithms for the per-capita (and other monotone nondecreasingly weighted versions of the) least core and the (pre)nucleolus in specific classes of balanced games with polynomial many dually essential coalitions.
Schlagwörter: 
nucleolus
least core
weighted nucleoli
efficient computation
cooperative game
JEL: 
C71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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