Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/222019 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2018/6
Publisher: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Abstract: 
In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in this case, we first focus on other notions of stability such as the notions of subsolution and von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case where each sector of the market has two agents. Furthermore, for any three-sided assignment market, we prove that the union of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with respect to those allocations that are compatible with that matching, and this union is always non-empty.
Subjects: 
Assignment game
core
subsolution
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set
JEL: 
C71
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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