Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221435 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1993
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1078
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper descrives some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurment policy analysis. It descrives the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive problems between government and defense firms and incentive problems within government are both considered.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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