Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/219181 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 1-10
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
In this article, we analyze the stability of couples on the marriage market. Recent developments in cooperative game theory allow a new model that uses team games which make it possible to model the marriage market. Coalition structures can model couples. We analyze two cases: a symmetrical one with only one type of men and one type of women; and one with several types of women and men.
Subjects: 
team games
c-value
stability of couples
marriage market
JEL: 
C71
C78
J12
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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