Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217313 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Central Bank Review (CBR) [ISSN:] 1303-0701 [Volume:] 18 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 29-34
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
This paper studies optimal distribution of skills in an optimal income tax framework with convex skill constraints. The problem is cast as a social planning problem where a redistributive planner chooses how to distribute a given amount of aggregate skills across people. We find that optimal skill distribution is either perfectly equal or perfectly unequal, but an interior level of skill inequality is never optimal.
Subjects: 
Skill distribution
Convex skill costs
Optimal taxation
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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