Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/215163 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 12767
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Using data from the representative IAB Establishment Panel in Germany and estimating a panel probit model with fixed effects, this paper finds a negative relationship between the existence of owner-management in an establishment and the probabilities of having a works council or a collective bargaining agreement. We show that family firms which are solely, partially or not managed by the owners significantly differ in the presence of works councils and collective bargaining agreements. The probabilities of having works councils and collective agreements increase substantially if just some of the managers do not belong to the owner family. We argue that these differences cannot simply be attributed to an aversion of the owners against co-determination and unions but require taking account of the notion of socio-emotional wealth prevalent in family firms. In addition, our results support the idea that external managers mainly act as agents rather than stewards in family firms.
Subjects: 
industrial relations
co-determination
works council
collective agreement
family firm
Germany
JEL: 
J53
M54
G32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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