Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214898 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Politics & Society [ISSN:] 15527514 [Issue:] Online First: March 17, 2020 [Publisher:] Sage [Place:] Thousand Oaks [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-31
Publisher: 
Sage, Thousand Oaks
Abstract: 
Corporate concentration in the United States has been on the rise in recent years, sparking a heated debate about its causes, consequences, and potential remedies. This article examines a facet of public policy that has been neglected in the debate: corporate taxation. Developing the first empirical mapping of the effective tax rates of nonfinancial corporations disaggregated by size and broken down by jurisdiction, the article reveals a striking tax advantage for big business at home and abroad. The analysis goes on to show how persistent regressivity in the tax structure is bound up with the increasing relative power of large corporations within the corporate universe, as well as a shift in firm-level power relations. As large corporations become less disposed to investments that may indirectly benefit ordinary workers, they become more disposed to shareholder value enhancement that directly benefits the asset-rich. What this means is that the corporate tax structure is connected not only to rising corporate concentration but also to widening household inequality.
Subjects: 
corporate taxation
concentration
inequality
capital as power
financialization
JEL: 
P16
H2
G3
G
URL of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Manuscript Version (Preprint)

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