Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214550 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2014-04
Publisher: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Zürich
Abstract: 
Awards appear in various forms, ranging from the title "Employee of the Month" to prizes, decorations, and other honors. This contribution develops a theory designed to analyze the widely-observed phenomenon of award giving. We use signaling theory as a basis for our discussion. The perspectives of the giver, and of (potential) recipients, of awards are studied in a principal-agent framework. The analysis highlights conditions under which signaling failures are likely to arise and compares awards with monetary compensation. The paper informs management practice by presenting a systematic appraisal of the signaling functions of awards. It proposes under which conditions awards tend to raise performance, and when monetary compensation proves to be superior.
Subjects: 
Awards
prizes
incentives
signaling theory
principal-agent framework
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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