Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214446 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2009-19
Verlag: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
Improving transparency and enabling the principal to hold its agents accountable is a major issue in any principal agent relationship. This paper focuses on the role of public auditors in this task and presents evidence on the impact of auditor term length and term limits on government performance at the US State level. While the empirical results for the influence of term length are ambiguous, I find strong evidence for a positive and significant influence of term limits on state credit ratings. Auditors who face a binding term limit seem to be more effective monitors, which improves credit ratings.
Schlagwörter: 
Direct Democracy
public auditor
tenure length
term limit
governance
JEL: 
H11
H83
D70
H10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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