Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214417 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2008-23
Publisher: 
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Basel
Abstract: 
This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public administration and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of bureaucrats in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed political neutrality of the public service and generates a conflict of interest. We present a cost-benefit calculus and analyze specific legal provisions for the German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. Based on a novel data set, we find that incompatibility rules decrease and abeyance compensation increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.
Subjects: 
Political selection
parliamentary election
public servants
incompatibility
JEL: 
D72
D73
H11
H83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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