Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/211043 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
PIDS Discussion Paper Series No. 2018-23
Publisher: 
Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), Quezon City
Abstract: 
Why, after more than twenty-five years of decentralization, are Philippine local government units (LGUs) at varied levels of development? How does the literature explain this phenomenon? This paper surveys empirical literature on Philippine decentralization with the aim to gather insights as well as distill stylized facts emerging from the evidence explaining local government performance and development. Looking at history, political science, economic and institutional perspectives, the role of past events and the evolution of local government institutions, politicians and voters evidently in influencing current decentralization dynamics became evident. Though mandates and laws are the same across local governments, except perhaps for the autonomous regions, some of these mandates were identified as limitations affecting performance. Political and socioeconomic differences across LGUs have also been offered as explanations. What seems to be promising is the recent trend in examining Philippine governance and the roles of policymakers and voters more deterministically. Patronage and political dynasties have similar origins and, at present, are studied as reasons behind varied local government performance. Evidence has shown that certain activities used to perpetuate patronage and dynasties (also called family networks) such as coercion through vote-buying (also defined as clientelistic goods) were found to affect the provision and in one case, negatively affect the quality of public services. On the other hand, studies have also shown that publicly provided private/clientelistic goods such as social services are preferred by voters or are distributed by incumbent politicians who are members of political dynasties facing their last term in office. [...]
Subjects: 
local governments
patronage
median voter
clientelism
political dynasties
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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