Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/210759 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Staff Report No. 907
Publisher: 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY
Abstract: 
How does information management and control affect bank stability? Following a national bank holiday in 1933, New York state bank regulators suspended the publication of balance sheets of state-charter banks for two years, whereas the national-charter bank regulator did not. We use this divergence in policies to examine how the suspension of bank-specific information affected depositors. We find that state-charter banks experienced significantly less deposit outflows than national-charter banks in 1933. However, the behavior of bank deposits across both types of banks converged in 1934 after the introduction of federal deposit insurance.
Subjects: 
information management
bank opacity
banking crisis
Great Depression
depositor confidence
JEL: 
G21
G28
N22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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