Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/209768 
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Arbeidsnotat No. 1999/2
Publisher: 
Norges Bank, Oslo
Abstract: 
We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways; a) by having a small number of contestants, and b) by restricting contestant quality. The results may contribute to our understanding of such diverse phenomena as promotion processes in firms, selection of fund managers and research tournaments.
Subjects: 
contest
risk taking
selection
tournament
JEL: 
C44
D29
D83
J41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
82-7553-136-5
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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