Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/207210 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7819
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Why do politicians rebel and vote against the party line when high stakes bills come to the floor of the legislature? We leverage the three so-called Meaningful Votes that took place in the British House of Commons between January and March 2019 on the Withdrawal Agreement that the Conservative government had reached with the European Union to address this question. The Withdrawal Agreement was decisively defeated three times and a major revolt amongst Conservative backbench Members of Parliament (MPs) was instrumental in this. We find that three factors influenced their rebellion calculus: the MP’s own preference, constituency preferences and career concerns. Somewhat paradoxically, the rebellion within the Conservative Party came from MPs who had supported Leave in the 2016 Brexit referendum and from MPs elected in Leave leaning constituencies.
Schlagwörter: 
Brexit
roll call votes
rebellions
party discipline
party coherence
House of Commons
JEL: 
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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