Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/204733 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SITE Working Paper No. 22
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple models to characterize their comparative static properties, and quantify them with simulations based on market data. We conclude by discussing the obvious need to depart from these distortive rules-of-thumb that appear to have the potential to substantially reduce social welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
Antitrust
Deterrence
Fines
Law Enforcement
JEL: 
K21
L40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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