Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/203567 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2019: 30 Jahre Mauerfall - Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft - Session: Experimental Economics I No. A06-V3
Verlag: 
ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel, Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates how negotiations between employers and employees respond to exogenous and endogenous wage transparency. In a treatment with exogenous wage transparency, employers' offers increase significantly compared to the case when offers are private information. Moreover, the share of equal wage offers becomes larger. Employers and employees rarely induce transparency themselves. In a treatment where employees could enforce transparency, average wage offers are significantly lower than in the other treatments. Thus, employees forego potential wage increases by staying ignorant about co-workers' offers. Taken together, these findings have important implications for recent policies aimed at increasing wage transparency.
Schlagwörter: 
Wage transparency
wage negotiations
real-effort
gift exchange
experiment
JEL: 
D91
J31
M52
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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