Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202786 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 12440
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In many countries, the termination of employment contracts has to be either on employer initiative or on employee initiative. Furthermore, the cost of the procedure is borne mainly by the contracting party who takes the initiative and there is little room for sharing costs. The implicit doctrine is that employment termination has to be the last resort, the ultima ratio. In 2008, the French government initiated a change in doctrine: it became possible to terminate employment contracts by mutual consent, at lower costs. Building on firm-level data, we develop an event analysis which reveals that the reform was followed by a decline in dismissals as well as by a significant rise in overall separation rates. By promoting separation by mutual consent, the reform reduced labor litigation risks, boosted workers' flows, but, eventually, we do not detect any effect on firms' employment levels.
Schlagwörter: 
employment termination
dismissal
quit
labor litigation
severance payment
JEL: 
J23
J52
J63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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