Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/202399 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
EAG Discussion Paper No. EAG 12-6
Verlag: 
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Economic Analysis Group (EAG), Washington, DC
Zusammenfassung: 
In markets for experience or credence goods adverse selection can drive out higher quality products and services. This negative implication of asymmetric information about product quality for trading and welfare, poses the question of how such markets first originate. We consider a market in which sellers make observable investment decisions to enter a market in which each seller's quality becomes private information. Entry has the tendency to lower prices, which may lead to adverse selection. The implied price collapse limits the amount of entry so that high prices are sustained in equilibrium, which results in above normal profits. The analysis suggests that rather than observing the canonical market collapse, markets with asymmetric information about product quality may instead be characterized by above normal profits even in markets with low measures of concentration and less entry than would be expected.
Schlagwörter: 
adverse selection
asymmetric information
quality
experience goods
cre- dence goods
entry
entry barriers
JEL: 
D8
D4
L1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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