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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 887
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is no significant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very large effort levels increases.
Schlagwörter: 
transparency
reciprocity
reputation
gift exchange
inequity aversion
JEL: 
C72
J33
C91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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