Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/198806 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7446
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having com- mitted a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. When extradition is sufficiently costly, in- stead, a large enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country whose law they infringed. The fear of paying the extradition cost enables the countries coordinating on the efficient outcome.
Subjects: 
crime
enforcement
extradition
fleeing
migration
JEL: 
K14
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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