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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1021
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive-offer competition between two existing upstream firms. Under exclusive-offer competition, the upstream firm's profit depends on the rival's exclusive offer. If the rival makes an exclusive offer acceptable for the downstream firm, the upstream firm is excluded unless it succeeds in exclusion. Consequently, the upper bound of exclusive offers becomes higher than when one of the upstream firms is a potential entrant that cannot make any exclusive offer. Thus, the exclusion of the existing upstream firm can be an equilibrium outcome even in the case where the potential entrant is never excluded.
Schlagwörter: 
Antitrust policy
Exclusive dealing
Exclusive-offer competition
Imperfect competition
JEL: 
L12
L41
L42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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