Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197687 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1013
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
We study strategy-proof rules for choosing between two alternatives. We consider the full preference domain which allows for indifference. In this framework, for strategy proof rules, ontoness does not imply efficiency. We weaken the requirement of efficiency to ontoness and characterizes the class of strategy-proof rules. We argue that the notion of effciency is not desirable always. Our main result provides a simple characterization of the class of onto, anonymous and strategy-proof rules in this framework. Our analysis can help policy makers choose among these rules.
Subjects: 
Strategy-proofness
Anonymity
Generalized voting by committees
Quota rules
Welfare dominance under preference replacement
JEL: 
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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