Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/196765 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 12267
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We study how help can be fostered by means of a team bonus in the presence of rank-order tournaments. In a simple model we combine elements of relative rewards and a team bonus and study their effect on effort, help and sabotage. Quite intuitively the theoretical analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. This problem is mitigated by a team bonus that is proportional to the output of the whole team. We compare different parameter constellations of the theoretical benchmark with behavior observed in a one-shot experiment.
Schlagwörter: 
help
relative rewards
team incentives
experiment
JEL: 
M52
J33
J41
L23
C72
C91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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