Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/194354 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
cege Discussion Papers No. 241
Version Description: 
Revised Version March 2019
Publisher: 
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege), Göttingen
Abstract: 
I model the market for an active ingredient (with a brand-name drug and n differentiated generic versions) to study the effect of a substitution rule on prices and the extensive and intensive margin of generic competition. Both substitution rules with physician and patient veto decrease the brand-name price and shift market shares from the brand-name drug to the generics. A substitution rule with physician (patient) veto increases (decreases) generic prices and increases (decreases) the number of generic firms.
Subjects: 
substitution rule
generic competition
JEL: 
I18
I11
L50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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