Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192662 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 680
Verlag: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
Relying on a small natural field experiment with random assignment of treatments, I estimate effects of three core elements of most monitoring and enforcement practices: self-reporting, audit frequency and specific deterrence. I find evidence of evasive reporting of violations in self-audits, as more violations are detected in on-site audits than in self-audits. Announcing the increased audit frequency has no effect on compliance, but an audit raises the firm's subsequent compliance substantially.
Schlagwörter: 
environmental regulation
enforcement
EPA
natural field experiment
random assignment
JEL: 
K42
C93
Q58
D21
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
208.42 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.