Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192608 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers No. 626
Publisher: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Abstract: 
Abstract: Motivated by the climate problem, this paper examines some effects of international cap & trade when national quotas result from strategic choice. In contrast to the fairly optimistic tone of closely related literature, the tenor of our results is pessimistic. We find that though an international permit market may flourish, it will mainly redistribute income. As far as emissions reductions are concerned, the classical, rather inefficient, noncooperative outcome will prevail, regardless of the presence of cap & trade.
Subjects: 
International emissions trading
global externality
endogenous endowments
emissions taxes.
JEL: 
C72
D62
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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