Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192487 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers No. 505
Publisher: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Abstract: 
Recent contributions show that climate agreements with broad participation can be implemented as weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria in simple models of greenhouse gas abatement where each country has a binary choice between cooperating (i.e., abate emissions) or defecting (no abatement). Here we show that this result carries over to a model where countries have a continuum of emission choices. Indeed, a Pareto-efficient climate agreement can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, for a sufficiently high discount factor. This means that one need not trade-off a "narrow but deep" treaty with a "broad but shallow" treaty.
Subjects: 
Climate
non-cooperative game-theory
repeated games
weakly renegotiation-proof agreements
JEL: 
C72
F53
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
557.12 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.