Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192456 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers No. 474
Publisher: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Abstract: 
The dual income tax provides the self-employed individual with large incentives to participate in tax minimizing income shifting. The present paper analyses the income shifting incentives under the Norwegian split model in the presence of technology risk, and it concludes that the widely held corporation serves as a tax shelter for high-income self-employed individuals. In addition, real capital investments with a low risk profile are means to shift income from the labor income tax base to the capital income tax base for the high-income self-employed.
Subjects: 
Dual income tax
tax avoidance
risky investments
choice of organizational form
JEL: 
H24
H25
H32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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