Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192292 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 310
Verlag: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
Several economists have maintained that social and internalized norms can enforce cooperation in public good situations. This experimental study investigates impacts of social and internalized norms for cooperation among strangers in a public good game. The experiment has two treatment effects. First, it reveals each person's identity and his contribution to the public good. Second, it presents the public good game in a language which suggests associations to social and internalized norms for cooperation. Both treatment effects increase voluntary contributions significantly. These results suggest two important policy tools to crowd in social and internalized norms in a public good situation.
Schlagwörter: 
Cooperation
Framing
Public goods
Social approval
Social norms.
JEL: 
A13
C91
D11
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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