Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192292 
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers No. 310
Publisher: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Abstract: 
Several economists have maintained that social and internalized norms can enforce cooperation in public good situations. This experimental study investigates impacts of social and internalized norms for cooperation among strangers in a public good game. The experiment has two treatment effects. First, it reveals each person's identity and his contribution to the public good. Second, it presents the public good game in a language which suggests associations to social and internalized norms for cooperation. Both treatment effects increase voluntary contributions significantly. These results suggest two important policy tools to crowd in social and internalized norms in a public good situation.
Subjects: 
Cooperation
Framing
Public goods
Social approval
Social norms.
JEL: 
A13
C91
D11
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
128.31 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.