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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19130
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Goerke, Laszlo | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:55:16Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:55:16Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19130 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on productionactivities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affectcorruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induceless corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a nonsystematicimpact on tax evasion behaviour. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1666 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D73 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H26 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H25 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | corruption | en |
dc.subject.keyword | firms | en |
dc.subject.keyword | tax evasion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Korruption | en |
dc.subject.stw | Unternehmensbesteuerung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuervermeidung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuerkriminalität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 51002002X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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