Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19103 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1639
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Democratic societies are challenged by various violent and organized groups, be they terrorists, gangs or organized hooligans. In exchange for offering an identity, leaders in such groups typically require members to be violent. We introduce a simple model to capture these stylized facts, and then study the effects of policing. We find that an increase in the marginal cost of violence always reduces violence, while increasing the indiscriminate fixed cost may backfire and result in smaller and more violent groups.
Subjects: 
violence
terrorism
gangs
hooliganism
supporter clubs
JEL: 
D74
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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