Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/190567 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 18-052
Publisher: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Abstract: 
I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this set-up, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy- proof. Both solutions are disjoint.
Subjects: 
dichotomous preferences
multi-unit assignment
Lorenz dominance
competitive equilibrium with equal incomes
JEL: 
C78
D73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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