Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19050 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1586
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise's choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs - here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument -, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.
Subjects: 
centralized vs. de-centralized decisions
taxes
MNEs
JEL: 
F23
H25
L23
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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