Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189482 
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 98-13
Publisher: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Abstract: 
The logical foundations of game-theoretic solution concepts have so far been developed within the confines of epistemic logic. In this paper we turn to a different branch of modal logic, namely temporal logic, and propose to view the solution of a game as a complete prediction about future play. We extend the branching time framework by adding agents and by defining the notion of prediction. We show that perfect information games are a special case of extended branching time frames and that the backward-induction solution is a prediction. We also provide a characterization of backward induction in terms of the property of internal consistency of prediction.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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