Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189450 
Year of Publication: 
1996
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 96-12
Publisher: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Abstract: 
Economists hold two opposing views of the stock market: one focuses on the negative effect on incentives of separating ownership and control, the other emphasizes its beneficial role for risk sharing. Using a generalization of Diamond''s model which incorporates the effect of entrepreneurial incentives, we show how these two views can be reconciled. We introduce the concept of a stock market equilibrium with rational competitive price perceptions (RCPP) and show that such and equilibrium leads to a constrained optimal trade-off between risk sharing and incentives. We give examples showing the difference between RCPP equilibria and the standard CAPM type equilibria of finance.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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