Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189359 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 1079
Publisher: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Abstract: 
This paper studies corporate governance when a firm operates in imperfect markets. We derive firms' decisions from utility maximization by individuals. If those involved in decisions are also consumers, the usual monopoly distortion is reduced. Corporate governance can effect the equilibrium in the product (or input) markets. This enables us to endogenize the objective function of the firm. If the firm cannot commit not to change its constitution, we find a Coase-like result where all market power is lost in the limit. We present a more abstract model of governance in the presence of market distortions.
Subjects: 
corporate governance
stakeholder
oligopoly
strategic delegation
JEL: 
D70
L13
L20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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