Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/187494 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 17-4
Verlag: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
We present a new solution concept for strategic games called comprehensive rationalizability that embodies "common cautious belief in rationality" based on a sound epistemic characterization in a universal type space. It refines rationalizability, but it neither refines nor is refined by iterated admissibility. Nevertheless, it coincides with iterated admissibility in many relevant economic applications.
Schlagwörter: 
Common assumption of rationality
common belief in rationality
iterated admissibility
rationalizability
lexicographic belief systems
JEL: 
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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