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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18717
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| Titel: | Fiscal and monetary interaction : the role of asymmetries of the stability and growth pact in EMU |
| Autoren: | Governatori, Matteo Eijffinger, Sylvester |
| Datum: | 2004 |
| Verleger: | |
| Reihe/Nr.: | CESifo working papers 1354 |
| Zusammenfassung: | The paper builds a simplified model describing the economy of a currency union with
decentralised national fiscal policy, where the main features characterising the policy-making
are similar to those in EMU. National governments choose the size of deficit taking into
account the two main rules of the Stability and Growth Pact on public finance. Unlike
previous literature the asymmetric working of those rules is explicitly modelled in order to
identify its impact on the Nash equilibrium of deficits arising from a game of strategic
interaction between fiscal authorities in the union. |
| Erscheint in der Sammlung: | CESifo Working Papers
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