Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/185709 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 39
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We use a model with agency frictions to analyze the structure of a dealer market that faces competition from a crossing network. Traders are privately informed about their types (e.g. their portfolios), which is something the dealer must take into account when engaging his counterparties. Instead of participating in the dealer market, the traders may take their business to a crossing network. We show that the presence of such a network results in more trader types being serviced by the dealer and that, under certain conditions, the book\'s spread shrinks. We allow for the pricing on the dealer market to determine the structure of the crossing network and show that the same conditions that lead to a reduction of the spread imply the existence of an equilibrium book or crossing network pair.
Schlagwörter: 
asymmetric information
crossing networks
dealer markets
non-linear pricing
principal-agent games
JEL: 
D42
D53
G12
G14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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