Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/185104 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 11644
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We conduct a field experiment to examine whether the deterrent effect of law enforcement depends on the salience of law enforcement activity. Our focus is on illegal disposal of household garbage in residential areas. At a random subset of 56 locations in a mid-sized city, law enforcement officers supplemented their regular enforcement activities by the practice of putting brightly-colored warning labels on illegally disposed garbage bags. This treatment made the existing enforcement activities suddenly much more apparent to residents. We find evidence for a substantial reduction in illegal disposal of garbage in response to the treatment.
Subjects: 
law enforcement
deterrence
perception
salience
disorder
JEL: 
C93
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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