Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/183454 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 1225
Publisher: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Abstract: 
This paper explores the dynamics of press freedom around events that threaten or oust the incumbent regime of a country. While democracies on average grant the press more freedom, our theoretical starting point is that democracies and autocracies may have similar incentives to protect the power of the governing regime. A priori it is, nevertheless, not clear whether democracies or autocracies react more harshly - by silencing or controlling the media - to an attempt to overthrow the government. We estimate the dynamics of press freedom around both failed and successful coups and find that although press freedom is quite stable, successful coups lead to a substantial reduction in press freedom. This is, however, only the case when the coup is directed against a democratically elected government.
Subjects: 
Coup
Political instability
Press freedom
JEL: 
D74
H12
L51
L82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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