Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/183434 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 1205
Publisher: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Abstract: 
This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. As was shown by Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), inducing a feeling of entitlement - one subject earning the endowment - strongly affects allocations in dictator games towards the owner of the money (both dictator and receiver). The present results show that seemingly small differences in instructions induce fundamentally different perceptions regarding entitlement. Behavior is affected accordingly, i.e. instructions inducing subjects to perceive the task as distributive rather than a task of generosity lead to higher allocations to receivers (average 52% vs. 35%). A theoretical explanation integrating monetary as well as social incentives and emphasizing potential effects of uncertainty about the latter is discussed (cf. Bergh and Wichardt, 2018).
Subjects: 
Dictator games
Framing effects
Property rights
Social preferences
JEL: 
C70
C91
D63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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