Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/182079 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal [ISSN:] 1864-6042 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 2018-56 [Publisher:] Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) [Place:] Kiel [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 1-36
Publisher: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Abstract: 
This paper provides some elements to explain the observed takeover in some urban areas of a new kind of elite associated with new economy jobs, also known as "bourgeois bohème" (bobos). This takeover has been associated with greater investment in urban amenities and "clean" means of transport, with adverse effects on commuting time. The model allows us to explain those developments by productivity growth in the new economy, and by the differences in production processes between the new and old economies. The consequences of bobo takeover for house prices and employment of unskilled service workers are also discussed. A bunkerized equilibrium in which skilled workers in the old economy no longer reside in the city and have been replaced by service workers is studied. In such an equilibrium urban amenities are at their maximum and commuting flows have been eliminated. For some parameter values, bobos are better-off under bunkerization, in which case they may gain by favoring it with a "diversity" subsidy for unskilled workers to reside in the city.
Subjects: 
new economy
urban amenities
bobos
residential choice
local public goods
urban voting models
bunkerization
JEL: 
H7
R3
R4
R5
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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